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Risky anthropic reasoning in cosmology.
For or against an evolutional nature of the Universe?
Summary
In contemporary cosmology, from the creation of the General
Theory of Relativity to the second half of the twentieth cen-
tury, the main task of cosmologists was to construct and test
cosmological models of the Universe. Nowadays you will no-
tice that besides these objectives there is a new type of jus-
tifying the fact that the observable Universe’s properties are
such as they are, and no other. Ways of reasoning called the
anthropic explanation are formed, attempting to answer the
question: why does the Universe have a nature (properties) nec-
essary for the biological life to come into existence in it? Their
objectives are: firstly, an attempt at solving the difficulties of
the Standard Cosmological Model, secondly, seeking an expla-
nation of the coincidence of large numbers and the so-called
physical constants. The supporters of this kind of explanation
are themselves aware of its fundamental weakness: it is nei-
ther a causal, nor a nomological explanation; it fails to have the
structure of a generalizing explanation, it is alleged to be a tau-
tology. The anthropic principle in cosmology was initially re-
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garded as an observational constrain for cosmological param-
eters of the standard model of the Universe. However, it can
be shown that some consequences of anthropic reasoning are
testable, as well as that its explanatory nature is more evident
in the specific forms of the theory of explanation.
Key words: cosmology — anthropic reasoning — multiverse
Introduction
Aristotelian Cosmology had a dualistic ontology: the earthly
sphere consisted of four elements: earth, water, air and fire. The natu-
ral movement of those earthly compounds was based on their natural
tendency to take up places according to their weight. In turn, the
beyond-lunar sphere was built of another, fifth element, character-
ized by an infinite circular motion around the center of the Universe.
Christianity took over this image, which corresponds to the convic-
tion that the humanity takes up a privileged position within the Uni-
verse. The works of Copernicus moved the center of the Universe
towards the Sun (1543). The 18th century along with the results of
William Hershel’s studies dispose us to think that the center of the
Universe is situated in the center of the galaxy. The discovery of Wal-
ter Baade in mid-20th century, that our galaxy is one of many spiral
type galaxies, and the earlier works of Harlow Shapley (1922) bring
about a new change of paradigm, seemingly irrevocably removing hu-
mankind from the center of the physical and philosophical frame of
reference. Thus, on the one hand we have the methodological aware-
ness, connected with the use of the so-called cosmological principle,
that our presence in the Universe from the global point of view, has no
special location; on the other hand, however, the objects surrounding
us locally, form quite a unique system, especially conductive to the
emergence and evolution of biological life.
The origins of anthropic thinking may be found already in the
19th century, in the works of Ludwig Boltzman, who aimed at de-
ducing the properties of the thermodynamic arrow of time from me-
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chanics, which lead him to the conviction that either our universe is
currently in a highly improbable state, or the region in which we are
located is only a small part of the Universe, which generally remains
in the state of thermodynamic balance. Boltzman is thought of as the
forerunner of the weak anthropic principle1.
This paper presents, first of all, the past and current ways of
anthropic thinking and ways to formulating the so-called anthropic
principle. We shall show that in a strictly defined sense one can
treat anthropic reasoning as, despite all the controversy, rooted in
the research practice of modern cosmology, which guides itself with
some main methodological principles. Science should be considered
as seeking the unchanging aspects of physical reality expressed in the
form of fundamental laws or principles. Every law uses constants, the
values of which it does not explain. The values of some of these con-
stants can be interpreted as particularly suited, as a kind of condition
necessary for the emergence of intelligent life. This necessary con-
dition is considered a selection tool, not an explanation that narrows
the collection of possible Universes.
The criticism of anthropic reasoning from a physical, philosophi-
cal, and— above all —methodological point of view depends onwhich
version of the anthropic principle we address. To begin with, let us
therefore clarify the difference between the weak and the strong an-
thropic principle. The weak anthropic principle states that we must
observe such a location in the world, which is friendly to life. The
powerful version replaces the term “location” with “Universe”, and
asserts in an ontologically powerful way that the world without in-
telligent observers is impossible. We argue that there is physical im-
portance only to the weak anthropic principle. It is not a principle or
law of the same significance as the physical laws are, but it could be
reasonably argued in favor of the explanatory nature of anthropic rea-
soning in its weak version, and even in favor of the possibility to test
its predictions of the scope of cosmological parameters allowing for
an evolution of the Universe as well as the evolution of biological life.
1 Cfr. Kanitscheider, The anthropic principle, p. 365.
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The strong version of the anthropic principle has a definite metaphys-
ical tinge, as it contains a speculation the character of a teleological
necessity: “the Universe needs to be the way it is”.
As a methodological tool performing a testing role in relation
to questions of cosmology, anthropic reasoning is one way of deal-
ing with problems generated by modern cosmology, especially in
the 1960s2. What is more, we shall present a strong connection be-
tween anthropic reasoning and thinking of the Universe in multiverse
terms, which form the context of anthropic thinking. Each of the
mentioned concepts will be provided with empirical-methodological
reservations.
Different forms of anthropic argumentation
The introduction mentioned Boltzman as the forerunner of an-
thropic thinking. It appears that in search for anthropic intuitions,
which are basically close (analogous) to its modern formulations, one
could reach further into history, that is to the breach of the age in
whichmodern physicswas born. One of themost interesting attempts
was made one year before the appearance of Newton’s Principia by
a French philosopher, Bernard Le Bouyier de Fontenelle (1657-1757),
who wondered why the orbits of comets within the solar system do
not fit within the ecliptic, and why they are so different from the plan-
ets’ orbits within the solar system. The answer to this question is quite
similar to anthropic reasoning and may even be treated as a predeces-
sor of such reasoning in the context of the solar system. Of course,
Le Bouyier de Fontenelle did not know the results of Newton’s and
Halley’s work. In 1686 he wrote:
the reason why the planes of cometary motion are beyond the
plane of the ecliptic and the plane of motion of any planet is
exceptionally obvious; If that were the case, it would be impos-
sible for the Earth not to find itself on a comet tail path. The
2 Cfr. Leciejewski, Rola zasad antropicznych, p. 15–83.
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possibility of encounters and collisions would be too frequent,
and, given the velocity of comets, such a collision would be
destructive to both bodies3.
Of course, such reasoning may not be called an explanation of
the comets’ movement in the nomological or causal sense, however it
does express the basic intuitions of selectively understood anthropic
reasoning. We thus have, according to Milan Ćirković, three kinds
of explanations, which may be extrapolated to the problems of cos-
mological fine tuning: an explanation resorting to a form of intelli-
gent design (in the form of theism, panentheism, normative neces-
sity with a source somehow outside the physical world); a causal or
nomologically-deductive explanation, which we speculatively predict
in the form of a Fundamental Theory that would be a form of a great
unification — a theory of everything; and finally the anthropic expla-
nation, understood in the spirit of multiverse thinking. It follows the
following scheme:
1) There exist all possible combinations of initial conditions,
2) there exists a subset of this set of all possibilities, which makes
it possible for intelligent observers to exist.
Returning to the analogy of a planetary system and Le Bouyier
de Fontenelle’s intuition, we could say that:
1) Assuming that within the whole galaxy there exist all forms of
planetary systems that are possible and admitted by Kepler’s
laws.
2) Our Solar System is contained within this set.
3) Our existence deems this system as allowing for such conditions
in which biological life may emerge and evolve.
3 Ćirković, On the first anthropic argument, p. 245.
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In our opinion, Le Bouyier de Fontenelle definitely formulated
a reasoning which could be called anthropic in the weak version,
although referring to the Solar System, not the Universe4.
The twentieth century context that possibly elicited the ideas of
anthropic solutions, was brought about by speculation on numerical
relationships between the values of physical and cosmological param-
eters. These relationships were discussed repeatedly in the literature
of the subject in a collective and critical manner5 , so here they shall
only be mentioned briefly. In 1923 Arthur Eddington calculated the
number of protons and electrons in the Universe (1079) noted that
it is connected (as a root) with the relation of the values of electro-
magnetism and gravity forces (1039)6 similar conclusion was reached
by Paul Dirac, who stated that the values of cosmological parameters
must be related to the age of the universe by means of an unknown
fundamental law7. Both forces, related to electrical and gravitational
interactions, take the form of a reverse relationship to the squared
difference between the charges or masses, which is why their ratio
in the case of an electron or a proton, for example, is a fundamen-
tal number. While considering the scenario of a dynamic universe,
speculation was made about the possibility of changing the value of
physics constants (such as the gravitational constant) in the course
of a cosmological evolution (such opinions were uttered by e.g. Ed-
ward A. Milne in his kinematic theory of gravity based on a priori
accepted rules, as well as by Dirac). In the quoted paper from 1961,
Robert H. Dicke substituted the speculation on the variable nature
of physical bodies with anthropic reasoning, which is not treated as
a cosmological principle, but a result of selection related to the possi-
ble values of these constants, assuming that carbon-based life is a fact
4 Cfr. Ćirković, On the first anthropic argument, p. 250.
5 Cfr. Griffiths, Book Reviews: Cosmology; Leciejewski, Rola zasad antrop-
icznych; Mosterín, Anthropic explanations in cosmology.
6 Cfr. Dicke, Dirac’s cosmology and Mach’s principle.
7 Cfr. Dirac, The cosmological constants.
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empirically dependent on the physical parameters of the microworld
and the paste of cosmological evolution8.
Christopher B. Collins and Steven Hawking continued thinking
within the framework of anthropic observation selection, not only of
the values of physical constants, but also such properties of the uni-
verse as isotropy or flatness. If biological life depends on the existence
and level of evolution of stars and galaxies, a universe with an exces-
sively great gravitational energy in its early phases of existence will
collapse before galaxies are able to form. If, in turn, this energy is
too low, condensed matter, which enables the emergence of stars and
galaxies, will not form9. Bernard Carr and Martin Rees in the late
1970’s proved that the emergence of biological life based on carbon is
incredibly sensitive to the fine-tuning of physical constants10. Bran-
don Carter’s article “Large Number Coincidences and the Anthropic
Principle in Cosmology”11 and a vast, 700 page book by John Barrow
and Frank TiplerThe anthropic cosmological principle12 are considered
to be the program works containing the formulation of each version
of the so-called anthropic principles.
Let us now enumerate the basic expressions of anthropic princi-
ples in their weak and strong forms. Konrad Rudnicki points out, that
in the weak version one claim that the physical properties of the ob-
servable part of the Universe are a logical consequence of the fact, that
the Universe is observed by human beings13. Probabilistically speak-
ing: a conditional probability of our universe, which belongs to the
set of the possible universes (where carbon-based life is permitted),
is different and greater than the absolute probability of the universe
without the existence of intelligent observers. As the weak version,
we can interpret in terms of physical principle of selection, the strong
8 Cfr. Vidal, Computational and biological analogies.
9 Cfr. C. B. Collins & Hawking, Why is the Universe isotropic?
10 Cfr. Carr & Rees, The anthropic principle.
11 Carter, Large number coincidences.
12 Barrow & Tipler, The anthropic cosmological principle; Anderson, Review: The
anthropic cosmological principle.
13 Cfr. Rudnicki, Zasady kosmologiczne.
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one is in fact metaphysical assumption. The strong Anthropic princi-
ple goes further. It states that an environment suitable for biological
life must exist. As expressed by Brandon Carter “the Universe (and
hence the fundamental parameters on which it depends) must be such
as to admit the creation of observers within it at some stage”14. Bar-
row and Tipler write in a similar way: “The Universe must have those
properties which allow life to develop within it at some stage in its
history”15.
Let us now briefly characterize the basic multiverse concepts.
The notion of multiverse is often used in the context of the anthropic
question as an attempt at its solution. The basic intuition binding
the multiverse with anthropic thinking is that the conditions in our
universe, where life emerged and evolved are discussed using the no-
tion of probability. Of course, this probability may be understood
differently: for example, in a Bayes way, if we point out the episte-
mological element of wonder at the fine tuning of physical parame-
ters observable in our universe16. We may also try to estimate the
probability density in a classical way, by theoretically building a cer-
tain sample space of universes with different physical constants and
parameters. The variety of multiverse concepts is connected to the
property of a certain set, in which we try to establish the probability
function. Overall, the intended effect of those attempts is such, that
although our universe still remains interpreted as fine-tuned, the is-
sue of its uniqueness ceases to exist. It is just one of many realizations
of a physical system that emerged in a certain configuration.
Let us begin with the concepts that are loosely, or not at all, con-
nected with anthropic problems. One of them is David Lewis’ pro-
posal called modal realism. This idea, of a rather formal nature, con-
sists of many universes which are logically possible. The main objec-
tion posed against this concept is its non-physicality, as the universes
are treated as mathematically allowed objects. Another proposal, far
14 Carter, Large number coincidences, p. 294.
15 Anderson, Review: The anthropic cosmological principle, p. 85.
16 Cfr. Garrett, A Bayesian looks at the anthropic principle.
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from anthropic thinking is the famous Everett’s multiverse, which in-
deed consists in asserting the real existence of states described by
a wave function. Everett’s worlds in quantum mechanics refer to
quantum states in superposition to one another.
The proposal by Alexander Vilenkin and Andre Linde is a mul-
tiverse concept based on quantum physics. It uses the mechanism
of eternal inflation in early cosmology of the Universe. Fluctuations
in quantum vacuum lead to the development of a separate (causally
and spatiotemporally) multitude of worlds. Each of those worlds, as
a result of the eternal inflation, produces further worlds, which take
up space-time within the primary structure. Our universe takes up
part of such space (a bubble universe). Although this concept is of-
ten charged with unfalsifiability and untestability due to a lack of
a causal relation between the worlds, the concept is a kind of a phys-
ical structure, in which a certain mechanism of creation is given,
which is causal and as such may be empirically tested, from within
our universe, of course.
Another proposal worth considering in the context of this dis-
cussion is Wheeler’s cyclic or oscillatory multiverse. It is a struc-
ture of inflating and deflating universes, each of which inherits dif-
ferent initial conditions and realizes another detailed scenario along
the lines of a similar scheme: big bang, expansion, contraction, big
crunch and a big bang again. Wheeler’s proposal met with basically
two main allegations: firstly, if the evolution dynamics is every time
potentially different, in case of a sufficiently long expansion phase
(if the universe becomes flat or open), infinite expansion is possi-
ble, which means breaking the cycle. Secondly, the succeeding uni-
verses lose the “memory” of their predecessors, which means that the
whole process does not guarantee, even in an infinite number of cy-
cles, an emergence of a universe such as ours. Ian Hacking inter-
preted this possibility in terms of the gambler’s fallacy, known from
statistics.
The last of these proposals is amultiverse by George F.R. Ellis and
Geoff Brundrit, who, based on an open, infinite universe by Friedman-
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Robertson-Walker, proposed a structure consisting of many separate
domains separated by an event horizon. The Ellis multiverse is infi-
nite and chaotic: it contains an infinite number of different states of
expansion and has, to a different extent, the property of homogene-
ity and isotropy. It is realized within the conceptual network of the
GTR. What draws criticism towards such concept is the fact that an
infinite set of certain values does not exhaust all possibilities17. For
example, an infinite set of all even natural numbers does not contain
e.g. the number 15 although it is infinite. A section of the real number
axis contains incalculably infinitely many real numbers, but still in-
finitely many natural numbers remain outside this section. Therefore,
the parameter space constructed by Ellis does not exhaust all possi-
bilities and does not mean that our universe will be contained within
the set.
Among the modern scientific speculations based on anthropic
reasoning as a selective factor we can cite Alexander Vilenkin18. As it
was suggested, anthropic arguments are sometimes judged as an un-
predictive speculations lore of no scientific value. Vilenkin showed
that this is not true if we treat anthropic reasoning as a selective pro-
cedure for the cosmological constant problems. There are two types
of the cosmological problem. The cosmological constant is associated
with the vacuum energy density, ρV . It seems to be natural to set its








)4eV. This is Cosmic Coincidence Problem (CCP1).
Before the discovery and an empirical confirmation of the ex-
pansion of the Universe, it was believed that something so small could
only be zero. In an accelerating universe, cosmological constant value
is observed to be ρV ∼ρM0∼
(
10−3
)4eV. Where ρM0 is the present
density of matter. Vilenkin writes:
17 Cfr. Earman, The sap also rises, p. 315.
18 Cfr. Vilenkin, Anthropic approach.
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This brings yet another puzzle. The matter density ρM and
the vacuum energy density ρV scale very differently with the
expansion of the universe, and there is only one epoch in the
history of the Universe when ρV ∼ρM . It is difficult to under-
stand why we happen to live in this special epoch. Another,
perhaps less anthropocentric statement of the problem is why
the epoch when the vacuum energy starts dominating the uni-
verse (zV ∼ 1) nearly coincides with the epoch of galaxy for-
mation (zG ∼ 1–3), when the giant galaxies were assembled
and the bulk of star formation has occurred19.
This is the second Cosmic Coincidence Problem (CCP2).
An attempt at assessing the epistemic value of anthropic principles
Let us notice here the fundamental objection: it seems to be a tau-
tology. Let q be the premise: “all physical constants have values, as we
observe them”; and p = “there are existing observers”. The q is a nec-
essary condition of p only if “p → q”. So, we have a modus ponens
as follows: [(p → q) ∧p] → q. The weak anthropic principle is for-
mally (logically) correct but does not explain anything. The anthropic
principle is not a principle in the sense of physical principles or cos-
mological principles20. It suffers the paradoxes well known from the
Hempel’s deductive-nomological framework. There are questions as
to the physical aspects of anthropic reasoning21. And it is post hoc:
it is hard to find any predictions based on anthropic thinking that
lead to uncovering a previously unknown property of the Universe.
The problem of the anthropocentric role of the observer. The an-
thropic principle helps select the values of physical constants and big
numbers only with respect to their order of magnitude (not the exact
values).
19 Ibid., p. 1194.
20 Cfr. McMullin, Indifference principle.
21 Cfr. Carr & Rees, The anthropic principle.
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As we stated, while the weak version can be interpreted in terms
of a physical principle of selection, the strong anthropic principle is in
fact ametaphysical assumption. The physical properties of the (entire)
Universe are a logical consequence of the fact that there are observers
in some region of the Universe. Our existence has an impact on the
properties of the Universe.
What type of explanation does anthropic reasoning offer? Let us
relate to a certain property of the Universe. The anthropic answer to
the question: Why does the Universe fulfill the cosmological principle
(it is homogeneous and isotropic on a large scale) is: because we are in
this universe. Of course, the properties of homogeneity and isotropy
are not a consequence of our existence in the Universe (neither in
the causal nor teleological sense). The consequence of our existence
is not the isotropic nature of the Universe, but the fact that we are
able to observe the Universe as such. The mere fact of observation is
a consequence! It corresponds with a remark made by Carter himself,
who expressed his regret that instead of “the anthropic principle” he
did not use the term “cognizability principle”.
Let us reconstruct in a more detailed way the structure of the
anthropic argument:
1. The values of cosmological parameters are not a logical conse-
quence of a more fundamental physical law.
2. Hence, we may say that their values are random or incidental.
3. If the values are incidental, the could have been different.
4. The emergence of biological life depends on many coexisting
parameters and physical constants (both on the physical and
chemical level).
5. The anthropic argument states that such co-occurrence of so
many parameters could not have happened incidentally.
The first issue of a logical and physical nature that this form of
the anthropic argument ensues is that the above depicted reasoning
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leads to an assertion that a universe with other physical parameters
does not allow for the emergence of biological life. On the other hand,
it may be stated that scientific speculation concerning the possibility
of life emerging in a universe with a different structure of cosmolog-
ical parameters is nonsensical, because it is inevitably based on the
laws and principles that rule our universe. This is why calculating
a degree of probability of life’s existence in a multiverse set is doomed
to failure. The anthropic reasoning seems to depend on the claim that
we can know it is very improbable that other universes, with different
laws or constants, could support life. We speculate about the hypo-
thetical universes on the basis on the knowledge elaborated in our
Universe. We make those calculations only by using the scientific
laws of this universe. But the premises of anthropic principles say the
universes could be (or is in principle) other than they are. As a result
of that we cannot be sure, that the conditions of our Universe are so
improbable and that there is no life in different universes. Moreover,
we assume the premise, incorporated in anthropic abductive think-
ing is true, that the knowledge of the laws of biology, chemistry and
physics is not only the truth, but it always has (during past evolution
of the Universe). The progress of exhaustive scientific explanation for
the fact of life; its origins and prospects of future evolution is still in
the state of search for final theory. In other words, we can say, that
the fact that (b) there is a life in the Universe based on carbon biology
(explanans) implies both: (a) that the Universe embodies the global
properties observed as cosmological coincidences and (c) the global
properties of the Universe form the conditions for the existence of
the life in the Universe based on carbon biology. It is however not
equivalent to the reasoning that (a) and (c) imply (c).
So, the whole anthropic argumentation may be undermined by
a simple statement arguing that we cannot be certain that a uni-
verse with different parameters does not allow for the existence of
an intelligent observer.
For example, […] if the mass of the neutrino had been ten times
greater, “the gravitating power of the primeval background
would have caused a drastic alteration in the expansion of the
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universe…” But how dowe calculate what would happen in hy-
pothetical universes having greater neutrino mass? Obviously,
we can make those calculations only by using the scientific
laws of this universe — the laws which the APDA says could
be other than they are. […] But “the equations of physics” can
only mean the equations we have learned from observation of
the existing universe22.
An important argument that the multiverse concept does not
solve the problem of fine-tuning: it does not mean that the proba-
bility of our universe emerging within this set of universes increases.
It only means that the initial physical conditions of the multiverse are
generic, random. The emergence of our universe in this case is not
obvious.
[…] even if the hypothesis of there being many universes
increases the probability that some universe will be life-
permitting, it does not increase the probability that our uni-
verse is life-permitting. The hypothesis is that the initial con-
ditions and constants of each universe are chosen randomly
and independently of the other universe. The choices are like
independent rolls of a die23.
Differences and similarities between anthropic and evolution-
ary explanations can be found. Firstly, the direction of the explana-
tion is different: in the anthropic explanation, the conditions in the
Universe are the explanandum, while the fact that life exists is the
explanans.
The reasoning based on the weak version of the anthropic prin-
ciple is as follows: we are able to observe the world; therefore, the
world allows for the existence of intelligent observers. The properties
of the universe, which are such and no other, are related to the ve-
locity of the expansion of the universe, which is close to critical and
which leads to the fact that the universe is approximately isotropic.
22 Fulmer, A fatal logical flaw, p. 105.
23 Jesús Mosterín paper on www: http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/1658/1/
Anthropic_Explanations_in_Cosmology_.pdf, p. 28. This article appeared in:
Mosterín, Anthropic explanations in cosmology.
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This results in the Universe having such and no other properties, be-
cause we exist. The character of this reasoning is teleological. An
anthropic explanation is a bottom-up type of explanation, but it is
not inductive reasoning, because the fact of life’s existence in itself
is something individually special. The explanation is also two-staged.
First, reductive reasoning, i.e. looking for a reason to the obvious fact
of existence of biological life, and then deductive reasoning, where
we want to deduce life as a logical consequence of some established,
certain physical, chemical and biological principles. A weakness of
the whole reasoning may be found in its enthymematic character,
because we have to inevitably accept the knowledge concerning the
mechanisms of life’s emergence and evolution as true. A very impor-
tant consequence of anthropic reasoning for philosophy and science,
however, is that it states that life may not emerge in any random uni-
verse. Definitely, we need to be aware that there is often a mixture of
levels in establishing the relationship between the explanans and the
explanandum. Coincidences are scientific facts, while the anthropic
principle is a philosophical thesis. Kanitschneider also points out to
a certain anthropic paradox: from the cosmological point of view, our
location within the Universe is not special, however we located in an
especially fine-tuned “ecosystem”24. Should we therefore say that we
exist despite the Universe being homogenous and isotropic, or rather
because it is so?
In the previous paragraph, we have not pointed out to some
hopes of testing, in a physical sense, the concept of a multiverse
formed as a result of an inflation process, because the idea of inflation
itself is a well theoretically defined proposal, and models reconstruct-
ing an inflatory universe are being tested in cosmology today. For
us, in the context of the discussion taken up by this paper, it is espe-
cially important to present the relations between certain multiverse
concepts and the problems addressed by anthropic reasoning.
We may in a way say that the Universe has no center, or that the
center of the Universe is wherever the observer is. Any observer re-
24 Cfr. Kanitscheider, The anthropic principle.
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mains in the center of the universe they observe. Due to this location
and the fact that the position and duration of objects are described
using the notion of space-time, which constitutes a certain absolute
element in the General RelativityTheorem, one could point out to two
kinds of objects: world lines in a space-time diagram denote objects
that last in time, while points mark objects of only temporary exis-
tence. As a result, we distinguish two kinds of horizons determining
our cognitive access to objects within the Universe: a particle horizon
and an event horizon. A particle horizon may be imagined as a sur-
face in space, where the observer is in the center. An event horizon
separates events that we are ever able to see from those that we will
never observe.
In static or dynamic homogenous and isotropic universes, the
event horizon broadens in relation to the observer at the speed of light.
In the case of a static universe, an event horizon does not exist — if
the universe is eternal, each event will eventually find itself within
the observer’s light cone. If the universe has an end, however, there
are events that remain outside the light cone.
The eternal world scenario, which leads to an inflation25 , the
pre-inflatory universe expands from the parameters (t = 10−44s,
density = 1094g/cm2, T = 1032K) in the Planck scale, to the
universe of the grand unification epoch (t = 10−36s, denstiy =
1078g/cm2, T = 1028K). During this process, the pressure is pos-
itive and the universe decelerates. A delay in the phase of transi-
tion to quarks and leptons, leads to a negative pressure, which in
turn drives the exponentially expanding universe in the phase from
10−36 to 10−34s. The accumulated energy translates into mass, which
retains the pressure on a constant level.
The inflation solves a number of problems emerging in relation
to the evolution of the Universe: the problem of magnetic monopoles,
the problem of flatness of the Universe, the problem of the horizon.
The flatness problem contains itself in the question: why is the early
25 Cfr. Guth, Inflationary universe.
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Universe characterized by such flatness — why is its curvature so
small? If the curvature was positive, the post-expansion universe
would begin to shrink until collapse. In the case of a negative curva-
ture, the standard cosmological model predicts an eternal expansion
of the universe. Anthropic reasoning is an attempt at answering the
close to zero curvature problem, as it states that only in a nearly flat
universe, the evolution of life is possible. The inflation theory gives
an explanatory better answer, because it offers a causal mechanism:
the flat Universe is a result of a rapid and quick expansion that took
place in the inflation phase26.
The third problem that the inflation theory attempts to answer is
the horizon problem. Intuitivelywe could say that the particle horizon
is connected with a maximum distance between the observer and the
observed object that possibly can causally influence the observer. The
particle horizon recedes from us at the speed of light. In an expand-
ing universe, the distance that the light needs to cover is constantly
increasing, as space expands. The horizon problem is connected to:
how past events may be searched for the reasons of the Universe’s
present state, since they were outside the horizon in the past. The
phenomenon of inflation solves this problem, by making the regions
of the early universe remaining in a causal interaction, have retained
the effect of homogeneity connected to the earlier causal interaction
as a result of the rapid expansion.
Conclusion
The problem of the so-called fine-tuning has been traditionally
met with three types of answers: a theistic answer (intelligent de-
sign), a multiverse answer, and finally accepting this state of affairs
as a fact that does not require an explanation or justification27. Let us
note, however, that such types of answers to the questions concern-
ing the role of the observer and the existence of an outside world have
26 Cfr. Koonin, The cosmological model of eternal inflation.
27 Cfr. R. Collins, Modern cosmology.
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their analogous equivalents in the discussion on realism, idealism and
antirealism in philosophy and science. The traditional discussion of
idealism calls the problem of existence and access to the outside world
a “scandal in philosophy”. Immanuel Kant in his Critique of pure rea-
son found it scandalous that we need to believe in the existence of
the outside world and that the proof of its existence has not been for-
mulated so far. Martin Heidegger found it scandalous that we expect
such proofs at all and that we try to create them.
The multiverse category meets an attempt to explain the unique-
ness and fine-tuning of our universe with our existence, using the
observer-selection principle. Of course, stating that our universe has
such values of physical constants and cosmological parameters that
allow and condition our existence is a tautology. But placing this
statement in the multiverse conceptual context makes us interpret
the data that we have access to differently. Therefore, if our uni-
verse is a part of a greater and more complex whole, the issue of fine-
tuning maybe does not disappear, but the epistemic “wonder” at it
does. In other words, we are able to say: it is not so, that the Universe
is fine-tuned for intelligent observers to appear, but the Universe is
fine-tuned — that is its physical parameters are such — that in a cer-
tain period of its evolution it allows for the existence of beings that
observe it and are aware of this fact.
From the physical point of view, those versions of the concep-
tual category of multiverse are especially interesting in that they de-
mand a physical mechanism of its emergence and evolution. Onemay
therefore say that the problem of fine-tuning does not in fact disap-
pear, but it is moved to a different level — the level of laws governing
the emergence of the superstructure of the multiverse. The situation
bears an analogy to the issue of the origin of life on Earth. There
have been ideas postulating an extraterrestrial origin of life on Earth
(panspermia). The problem of the origin of life still remains, as we
try to explain its development on our planet. Robin Collins points
out to an extraordinarily adequate analogy of the cosmological mul-
tiverse in the form of a thermodynamic observer, sometimes dubbed
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the “Boltzmann Brain”. Well, as an observer in a physical system de-
scribed in thermodynamic terms we may recognize such part of this
system, which is characterized by a state of low entropy, which is very
improbable, but possible.
Another proposal connected with the attempts at explaining the
specificity of our Universe is based on the consideration of theist
metaphysics, or more widely, a position named by John Leslie — axi-
archism28. It means adopting a certain order in the observed reality,
which points to the real existence of certain values apart from physics,
such as moral or ethical values. Therefore, axiarchism means the ac-
ceptance of the existence of a certain purposeful arrangement in the
world of physical phenomena, which has the properties of metaphys-
ical necessity. We could name many representatives of this way of
perceiving the question of the validity of fundamental laws. New-
ton, for example, discerned in nature a certain normative mechanism
regulating the behavior of physical systems.
A certain analogy to the concept of multiverse on the method-
ological level is the problem, known in the methodology of science,
of indefiniteness of theory by empirical data. It applies to the situa-
tion where a scientific theory confronted with empirical data allows
for the formulation of many hypotheses (construction of many mod-
els), which comparably well explain the data, at the same time allow-
ing different specific predictions concerning the behavior of the same
physical system in the future.
Streszczenie
W kosmologii współczesnej głównym zadaniem kosmologów
jest konstruowanie i testowanie modeli kosmologicznych. Po-
za tymi standardowymi procedurami pojawiają się szczególne
typy uzasadnień dla tego, że obserwowany Wszechświat po-
siada takie, a nie inne własności. Na pytanie: dlaczego Wszech-
świat posiada własności, które są konieczne dla zaistnienia w nim
28 Cfr. Leslie, Design and the anthropic principle.
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biologicznego życia?, proponowane są rozumowania nazywa-
ne antropicznymi, które fakt istnienia organizmów żywych
opartych na chemii związków węgla traktują jako element
wyjaśniający dla parametrów fizycznych. Artykuł przedsta-
wia krytykę wyjaśniającej funkcji tzw. zasad antropicznych
i sprowadza ich rolę (w szczególności zasady antropicznej
w wersji słabej) do czynnika selekcji dla wartości parametrów
kosmologicznych.
Słowa kluczowe: kosmologia — zasady antropiczne —
wieloświat
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